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Prospect theory is widely viewed as the best available descriptive model of how people eval-
uate risk in experimental settings1–6. According to prospect theory, people are typically risk-
averse with respect to gains and risk-seeking with respect to losses, known as the “reflection
effect”. People are usually much more sensitive to losses than to gains of the same magnitude,
a phenomenon called “loss aversion”7–12. Despite of the fact that prospect theory has been
well developed in behavioral economics at the theoretical level, there exist very few large-
scale empirical studies and most of them have been undertaken with micro-panel data11, 13–18.
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Here we analyze over 28.5 million trades made by 81.3 thousand traders of an online finan-
cial trading community over 28 months, aiming to explore the large-scale empirical aspect
of prospect theory. By analyzing and comparing the behavior of winning and losing trades
and traders, we find clear evidence of the reflection effect and the loss aversion phenomenon,
which are essential in prospect theory. This work hence demonstrates an unprecedented
large-scale empirical evidence of prospect theory, which has immediate implication in finan-
cial trading, e.g., developing new trading strategies by minimizing the impact of the reflec-
tion effect and the loss aversion phenomenon. Moreover, we introduce three novel behavioral
metrics to differentiate winning and losing traders based on their historical trading behav-
ior. This offers us potential opportunities to augment online social trading where traders are
allowed to watch and follow the trading activities of others19, by predicting potential winners
based on their historical trading behavior rather than their trading performance at any given
point in time.
We live life in the “big data” era. Many of our daily activities such as checking emails,
making mobile phone calls, posting blogs on social media, shopping with credit cards and making
financial trading online, will leave behind our digital traces of various kinds that can be compiled
into comprehensive pictures of our behavior. The sudden influx of data is transforming social sci-
ences at an unprecedented pace 20–22. Indeed, researchers are moving in a few years from dealing
with interviews of a few dozens of people by crafting survey questionnaire to experiments involv-
ing millions of subjects using social media 23.
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The availability of huge amounts of digital data also prompts us to rethink some fundamental
perspectives of complex human behavior. In this work we focus on economic decision under risk,
a key subject of behavior economics 24. Successful behavior economic theories acknowledge the
complexity of human economic behavior and introduce models that are well grounded in psycho-
logical research. For example, prospect theory is viewed as the best available descriptive model of
how people evaluate risk 1–3. Prospect theory states that people make decisions based on the po-
tential value of losses and gains rather than the final outcome, and that people evaluate these losses
and gains using certain heuristics. Despite the fact that prospect theory offers many remarkable
insights and has been studied for more than three decades, there exist very few large-scale empiri-
cal research and relatively few well-known and broadly accepted applications of prospect theory in
economics and finance6. The emergence of online social trading platforms and the availability of
burgeoning volume of financial transaction data of individuals help us explore the empirical aspect
of prospect theory to an unprecedented large-scale. Moreover, analyzing the trading behavior at
the individual level offers an excellent opportunity to develop pragmatic financial applications of
prospect theory.
By harnessing the wisdom of the crowds to our benefit and gain, social trading has been a rev-
olutionary way to approach financial market investment. Thanks to various Web 2.0 applications,
nowadays online traders can rely on trader generated financial content as the major information
source for making financial trading decisions. This “data deluge” raises some new questions, an-
swers to which could further deepen our understanding of the complexity of human economic
behavior and improve our social trading experience. For example, many social trading platforms
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allow us to follow top traders, known as gurus or trade leaders, and directly invest our money like
they do. The question is then how to identify those top traders. Analyzing their historical trading
behavior would be a natural starting point.
The financial transaction data used in this work comes from an online social trading platform
for foreign exchanges and commodities trading. This trading platform allows traders to take both
long and short positions, with a minimal bid of a few dollars as well as leverage up to 400 times.
The most important feature of social trading platform is that each trader automatically has all trades
uploaded to the platform where trades can be displayed in a number of statistical ways, such as
by the amount of profit made. Traders can then set their accounts to copy one or more trades
made by any other traders, in which case the social trading platform will automatically execute
the trade(s). Accordingly, there are three types of trades: (1) Single (or non-social) trade: Trader
A places a normal trade by himself or herself; (2) Copy trade: Trader A places exactly the same
trade as trader B’s one single trade; (3) Mirror trade: Trader A automatically executes trader B’s
every single trade, i.e., trader A follows exactly trader B’s trading activities. Both (2) and (3) are
hereafter referred to as social trading.
There are about 3 million registered accounts in this online social trading platform. Some of
them are practice accounts, i.e., trading with virtual money. Our data are composed of over 28.5
million trades made by 81.3 thousand traders trading with real money from June 2010 to October
2012. There are 31.8% single trades, 0.6% copy trades and 67.6% mirror trades. Apparently,
social trading dominates over this trading platform during the time window of our data. It will
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be desirable to learn how to select the best traders to follow so that we can further improve our
social trading experience — a pragmatic motivation of our current work. Quantitatively analyzing
trading activities of traders within the framework of behavior economics naturally fits the goal.
Ultimately, we would like to be able to predict potential winners based on their historical trading
behavior so that we can take full advantage of the social trading paradigm.
We first need to demonstrate if social trades really help. In Fig. 1 we compare the fraction
of winning trades (N+/N) and return on interest (ROI (%) := netprofit/investment× 100) of the
three different trade types. We find that all three trade types have more than 50% chance to generate
positive net profit (see Fig. 1a). Among them, mirror trade has the highest chance (≈ 83%), much
higher than that of single or copy trade. This indicates that in average social trades (especially
mirror trades) indeed help traders win more frequently than non-social trades. Interestingly, not
all the trade types have positive average ROI (see Fig. 1b). In fact, only mirror trade has positive
average ROI (≈ 0.03%), i.e., it generates profit, consistent with previous results 19. In terms of ROI,
social trades do not necessarily perform better than non-social trade. We notice that copy trade even
has higher negative ROI than non-social trade, which simply implies that copying someone based
on past performance can be dangerous.
Overall, mirror trade outperforms both single and copy trades. Yet, the better performance of
mirror trade comes at the price that its winning trades have much lower ROI (≈ 0.177%) than that
of copy and single trades (see Fig. 1c); while its losing trades have significantly higher negative
ROI (≈ −0.9%) than that of copy and single trades (see Fig. 1d). In other words, mirror trade
5
typically does not generate high profit for winning positions but generate high loss for losing
positions. Since mirror trade has very high chance of winning, the average ROI of mirror trade
turns out to be positive. This implies that there is still much room to improve our social trading
experience.
To further understand the difference between social and non-social trade types, we calculate
their duration distributions P (τ) (see Fig. 2). Here the duration τ of a trade or position is defined
to be its holding time (in unit of millisecond), i.e., τ := tclosed− topened where topened and tclosed are
the position opened and closed time, respectively. Interestingly, P (τ) displays similar fat-tailed
distribution for all different trade types. There are very few positions that were held for very long
time (more than one month). Most of the positions were held for less than half an hour. We also
notice that for losing positions, many of them are held for less than one second, while for winning
positions they are most likely held for longer than one second. This might be due to the so-called
bid-ask spread. The price we can sell (bid) and the price we can buy (ask) is different at each time
point. It is almost impossible for traders to overcome the spread within very short holding time
interval (e.g., one second) by using online financial trading platforms. For τ ∈ [103, 105], we find
that for all different trade types P (τ) of positive trades is much lower than that of negative trades,
i.e., winning probability is much less than 50% in this particular holding time window. Although
the duration distributions of different trade types share many similar features, we do observe a
noticeable difference in the regime of τ > 105, i.e., longer than one minute. We find that for non-
social trades with τ > 105, P (τ) of positive trades is roughly the same as that of negative trades.
In other words, if the holding time of a non-social trade is longer than one minute, the winning
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chance is about 50%. For copy trades with τ ∈ (105, 108), P (τ) of positive trades is slightly
higher than that of negative trades. For mirror trades with τ ∈ [105, 109], P (τ) of positive trades
is significantly higher than that of negative trades. In other words, if the holding time of a mirror
trade is longer than one minute and less than one week, then its winning chance is much higher
than 50%.
We also calculate the trade duration as a function of the net profit for different trade types
(see Fig. 3). We draw the box-and-whisker plot of duration (τ ) for trades with net profit (p) binned
logarithmically. (For negative trades p < 0, we bin them using |p|.) We denote the median value
of durations as τm. We find that for all trade types τm shows asymmetric behavior: τm of losing
positions with loss −p is generally higher than that of winning positions with profit p. This is a
reflection of the so-called “disposition effect”: investors tend to sell financial assets whose price
has increased while keeping asserts that have dropped in value 25–27. In other words, investors are
less willing to recognize losses, but are more willing to recognize gains. This is a typical irrational
behavior that can be partially explained by the “loss aversion” phenomenon and the “reflection
effect” in prospect theory. We also notice clear differences between mirror trade and the other two
trade types. For both non-social and copy trades τm generally increases as |p| increases in either
positive or negative direction, and τm of losing trades increases much faster as |p| increase than
τm of winning trades increases as p increase. While for mirror trade, τm increases very slowly
as p increases for positive positions. For mirror trades with negative p, τm increases initially as
|p| increases, but quickly reaches a plateau. In other words, the disposition effect is lessened in
mirror trade. It has been shown that more experienced investors are less affected by the disposition
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effect 28. This might explain the good performance of mirror trade.
To characterize the trading behavior of traders and identify potential trade leaders, we intro-
duce four behavioral metrics: (1) Risk-reward ratio r := 〈p+〉
〈|p
−
|〉
, where 〈p±〉 represents the average
profit of positive/negative trades made by each trader. r > 1 means that traders in average gain
more in positive trades than the loss in negative trades. (2) Win-loss holding time ratio s := 〈τ+〉
〈τ
−
〉
,
where 〈τ±〉 represents the average holding time of positive/negative trades made by each trader.
s > 1 means that traders in average hold positive position longer than negative position. (3) Win-
loss ROI ratio u := 〈ROI+〉
〈|ROI
−
|〉
, where 〈ROI±〉 represents the average ROI of positive/negative trades
made by each trader. u > 1 means that traders in average have larger absolute ROI in positive
trades than in negative trades. (4) Winning percentage w := N+
N++N−
, where N± represents the
number of positive/negative trades made by each trader. w > 1/2 simply means that traders in
average have larger chance of winning than losing a trade.
Note that if all traders trade pure randomly without any human emotions we would expect
that the distributions of all the four metrics show symmetric behavior around r = 1, s = 1,
u = 1 and w = 1/2, respectively. Yet, in reality traders behave quite differently from random (see
Fig. 4). We find the risk-reward distribution P (r) displays strongly asymmetric behavior around
r = 1 (black dotted line in Fig. 4a). For r > 1, P (r) follows a power law over almost 3 decades,
which means it is extremely difficult to find traders with very large r; while for r ≤ 1, P (r) is
almost a constant, which means traders with r ≤ 1 are almost uniformly distributed. By splitting
the traders into two groups: winning and losing traders (i.e., traders with final net profit or net loss)
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and calculating their P (r) with appropriate normalization based on the fractions of winning and
losing traders (14.7% and 85.2%, respectively), we find that the two groups behave in drastically
different ways (see Fig. 4b). Winning traders’ r-range spans over [10−2, 103]; while losing traders’
r-range is given by [10−4, 101]. The uniform P (r) for r < 1 is largely due to losers; while the
power-law of P (r) for r > 10 is purely due to winning traders. We also notice that for r < r∗ = 4
(pink line), P (r) of losing traders is significantly higher than that of winning traders; while for
r > r∗, it is in the opposite case.
We find the win-loss duration ratio distribution P (s) also displays strongly asymmetric be-
havior around s = 1 (black dotted line in Fig. 4c). For s > 1, P (s) almost follows a power law over
5 decades, which means it is extremely difficult to find traders with very large s; while for s ≤ 1,
P (s) decays very slowly as s decreases, which means traders with s ≤ 1 are almost uniformly
distributed. This indicates that most traders hold losing positions for a longer time than winning
position, a typical disposition effect. Comparing winning and losing traders’ P (s) is also interest-
ing (see Fig. 4d). Though their s-ranges are almost the same, we notice that for s < s∗ = 100
(pink line), P (s) of losers is significantly higher than that of winners; while for s > s∗, it is in the
opposite case.
The win-loss ROI ratio distribution P (u) shows a strong peak around u = 0.2 and a strongly
asymmetric behavior around u = 1 (black dotted line in Fig. 4e). For u > 0.2, P (u) follows a
power law over 3 decades, which means it is extremely difficult to find traders with very large u.
Interestingly, for u ≤ 0.2, P (u) also follows a power-law over almost 2 decades. We find P (u)’s
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of winning and losing traders are also very different (see Fig. 4f). Winning traders’ u-range spans
over [10−1, 300]; while losing traders’ u-range is given by [5 × 10−4, 300]. For u < u∗ = 2 (pink
line), P (u) of losing traders is significantly higher than that of winning traders; while for u > u∗,
it is in the opposite case. For u < 0.06, almost all traders are losing traders.
Note that a large portion of traders (85.2%) are losing traders with final net loss. The fact that
those losing traders typically have r < 1, s < 1 and u < 1 could be explained by the “loss aver-
sion” phenomenon and the “reflection effect” in prospect theory as follows. For positive positions,
traders tend to be risk-averse and will close the position quickly to take a small profit or a small
ROI. While for losing positions, traders tend to be risk-seeking and reluctant to close the positions
as quick as they should. Instead they keep waiting and hoping to recover the loss. If indeed this
happens, then they become risk-averse and tend to close the position quickly to take a small profit
and result in a small ROI. If unfortunately this does not happen, they waste not only valuable time
but also a lot of money, rendering large negative ROI. Thus, the losing traders have to suffer from
their irrational trading behavior that can be described by prospect theory.
One may naively consider the winning percentage type of behavioral metrics will help us
identify gurus. Here we show it is not the case. Fig. 4g displays the winning percentage distribution
P (w), which is asymmetric around w = 1/2. (Note that P (w) has significant peaks around
some simple rational numbers w = 0, 1/2, 1/3, 2/3, ..., 1, which are due to traders who made very
few transactions.) Again, we find winning and losing traders’ P (w) show dramatically different
behavior (see Fig. 4h). For w < w∗ = 0.95, P (w) of losing traders is significantly higher than that
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of winning traders; while for w > w∗ winning traders dominate. The value of w∗ is so high that
using it to select trade leaders is almost infeasible. We also notice that for w < w∗, losing traders
actually dominate for a wide range of w. Yet, they are still losing money eventually due to their
very low risk-reward ratio r. In other words, they win many times with small positive profit, but
once they lose they lose a lot.
In principle large values of those metrics do not imply net profit at all. For example, traders
with r ≫ 1 could be simply due to a few trades with very large profit, but many trades with very
small loss. Yet, the above analysis yields three characteristic values (r∗ = 4, s∗ = 100, u∗ = 2) that
can be used to statistically predict potential winning traders with high probability. We admit that
those characteristic values may slightly depend on the particular dataset or trading platform. We
emphasize that the strategy of using characteristic values of novel behavioral metrics to identify
potential winning traders should be applicable to general social trading platforms. Furthermore, the
existence of characteristic values (r∗, s∗, u∗) of these behavioral metrics indicates the importance
of controlling human emotion to minimize the impact of the reflection effect and the loss aversion
phenomenon for better trading performance.
Discussion
The dynamics of financial trading is governed by individual human decisions, which implies that
the trading performance could be significantly improved by understanding better the underlying
human behavior. In this work we systematically analyze over 28.5 million trades made by 81.3
11
thousand traders of an online financial trading platform. By analyzing and comparing the per-
formance of social and non-social trades, winning and losing traders, we find clear evidences of
the reflection effect and the loss aversion phenomenon, which are essential in prospect theory of
behavior economics. Many losing traders have very small risk-reward ratio (r), win-loss duration
ratio (s), and win-loss ROI ratio (u), suggest that we should develop new trading strategies by
systematically minimizing the impact of the reflection effect and the loss aversion phenomenon,
e.g., through intentionally controlling s, u and/or r to fight over our human nature and rationalize
our trading behavior.
To provide traders many preferences in discovering gurus or trade leaders, social trading
platforms rank traders on many different metrics, e.g., popularity (number of followers), profitable
weeks, and the personal return of rate calculated from the modified Dietz formula 29, etc. Those
different metrics typically yield different ranking lists, which effectively renders choosing the gurus
something of an inspirational affair or a delicate trick. Moreover, traders should take into account
the risks taken by these gurus in order to obtain the returns that they make. Unfortunately, not all
the metrics rank the performance of traders on a risk-adjusted basis. Here we propose three novel
behavioral metrics (risk-reward ratio r, win-loss holding time ratio s, and win-loss ROI ratio u),
which reveal the essence of prospect theory, the best available descriptive model of how people
evaluate risk in behavioral economics. These metrics are defined for each trader by comparing
his/her typical behavior in winning and losing trades, and hence are naturally risk-adjusted. Our
analysis suggests that these metrics can be used to statistically predict potential winning traders,
offering pragmatic opportunities to further improve our social trading experience.
12
References
1. Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 47, 263–291 (1979).
2. Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice.
Science 211, 453–458 (1981).
3. Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of
uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5, 297–323 (1992).
4. Wakker, P. & Tversky, A. An Axiomatization of Cumulative Prospect Theory.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 7, 147–75 (1993).
5. Schmidt, U., Starmer, C. & Sugden, R. Third-generation prospect theory.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 36, 203–223 (2008).
6. Barberis, N. Thirty years of prospect theory in economics: A review and assessment.
Journal of Economic Perspectives 27, 173–196 (2013).
7. Schmidt, U. & Traub, S. An Experimental Test of Loss Aversion.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 25, 233–249 (2002).
8. Schmidt, U. & Zank, H. Risk Aversion in Cumulative Prospect Theory. Royal Economic
Society Annual Conference 2002 162, Royal Economic Society (2002).
13
9. Schmidt, U. & Zank, H. What is Loss Aversion? Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 30, 157–167
(2005).
10. Brooks, P. & Zank, H. Loss Averse Behavior. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 31, 301–325
(2005).
11. Abdellaoui, M., Bleichrodt, H. & Paraschiv, C. Loss aversion under prospect theory: A
parameter-free measurement. Management Science 53, 1659–1674 (2007).
12. Schmidt, U. & Zank, H. Risk Aversion in Cumulative Prospect Theory. Management Science
54, 208–216 (2008).
13. Camerer, C. F. Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence From the Field. Working Papers 1037,
California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences (1998).
14. Abdellaoui, M. Parameter-Free Elicitation of Utility and Probability Weighting Functions.
Management Science 46, 1497–1512 (2000).
15. Wu, G., Zhang, J. & Abdellaoui, M. Testing Prospect Theories Using Probability Tradeoff
Consistency. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 30, 107–131 (2005).
16. Zhang, W. & Semmler, W. Prospect theory for stock markets: Empirical evidence with time-
series data. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 72, 835–849 (2009).
17. Booij, A., Praag, B. V. & Kuilen, G. V. d. A parametric analysis of prospect theory’s function-
als for the general population. Theory and Decision 68, 115–148 (2010).
14
18. Abdellaoui, M., Bleichrodt, H. & Kammoun, H. Do financial professionals behave according
to prospect theory? An experimental study. Theory and Decision 74, 411–429 (2011).
19. Pan, W., Altshuler, Y. & Pentland, A. Decoding social influence and the wisdom of the crowd
in financial trading network. In SocialCom/PASSAT, 203–209 (IEEE, 2012).
20. Lazer, D. et al. Computational social science. Science 323, 721–723 (2009). 10.1126/sci-
ence.1167742.
21. Battiston, S., Puliga, M., Kaushik, R., Tasca, P. & Caldarelli, G. Debtrank: Too central to fail?
financial networks, the fed and systemic risk. Scientific Reports 2 (2012). 10.1038/srep00541.
22. Preis, T., Moat, H. S. & Stanley, H. E. Quantifying trading behavior in financial markets using
google trends. Scientific Reports 3 (2013).
23. Bond, R. M. et al. A 61-million-person experiment in social influence and political mobiliza-
tion. Nature 489, 295–298 (2012).
24. Diamond, P. & Vartiainen, H. Behavioral Economics and Its Applications Hardcover (Prince-
ton University Press, 2007).
25. Shefrin, H. & Statman, M. The disposition to sell winners too early and ride losers too long
Theory and Evidence. The Journal of finance 40, 777–790 (1985).
26. Weber, M. & Camerer, C. The disposition effect in securities trading: An experimental analy-
sis. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 33, 167–184 (1998).
15
27. Barberis, N. & Xiong, W. What drives the disposition effect? an analysis of a long-standing
preference-based explanation. Journal of Finance 64, 751–784 (2009).
28. Costa, N. D., Goulart, M. & Cupertino, C. The disposition effect and investor experience.
Journal of Banking & Finance 37, 16691675 (2013).
29. Dietz, P. O. Pension Funds: Measuring Investment Performance (The Spaulding Series)
(Macmillian, 2004).
Author Contributions Y.-Y.L, J.N. and T.O. conceived and executed the research, and contributed equally
to this project. M.M. and Y.A. provided the raw data and involved in valuable discussions. Y-Y.L wrote the
manuscript with the assistance of J.N.,T.O., M.M. and Y.A.
Competing Interests The authors declare that they have no competing financial interests.
Correspondence Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to Yang-Yu Liu (email:
yyl@channing.harvard.edu).
16
 55
 60
 65
 70
 75
 80
 85
Single
Copy
Mirror
All
N
+
/N
 (
%
)
a
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
 0
 0.02
 0.04
Single
Copy
Mirror
All
<
R
O
I>
 (
%
)
b
 0.177
 0.178
 0.179
 0.18
 0.181
 0.182
 0.183
 0.184
Single
Copy
Mirror
All
<
R
O
I>
w
in
 (
%
)
c
-0.9
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
Single
Copy
Mirror
All
<
R
O
I>
lo
ss
 (
%
)
d
Fig.1
17
10-18
10-16
10-14
10-12
10-10
10-8
10-6
101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 1010 1011 1012
P
(τ
)
τ (ms)
All Trades
sec
min
hour
day
week
montha
negative
positive
10-18
10-16
10-14
10-12
10-10
10-8
10-6
101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 1010 1011 1012
P
(τ
)
τ (ms)
Non-social Trade
sec
min
hour
day
week
monthb
negative
positive
10-18
10-16
10-14
10-12
10-10
10-8
10-6
101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 1010 1011
P
(τ
)
τ (ms)
Copy Trades
sec
min
hour
day
week
monthc
negative
positive
10-18
10-16
10-14
10-12
10-10
10-8
10-6
102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 1010 1011
P
(τ
)
τ (ms)
Mirror Trades
sec
min
hour
day
week
monthd
negative
positive
Fig.2
18
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
1010
1011
-8 -6 -4 -2  0  2  4  6  8
τ
sgn(p)*log10(|p|)
All Trades
a
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
1010
1011
-8 -6 -4 -2  0  2  4  6  8
τ
sgn(p)*log10(|p|)
Non-social Trade
b
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
1010
1011
-8 -6 -4 -2  0  2  4  6  8
τ
sgn(p)*log10(|p|)
Copy Trade
c
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
1010
1011
-8 -6 -4 -2  0  2  4  6  8
τ
sgn(p)*log10(|p|)
Mirror Trade
d
Fig.3
19
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1 100 101 102 103 104
P
(r
)
r
Risk-reward ratio
a
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1 100 101 102 103 104
P
(r
)
r
Risk-reward ratio
b
losing
winning
10-10
10-9
10-8
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1 100 101 102 103 104 105
P
(s
)
s
Win-loss position duration ratio
c
10-10
10-9
10-8
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1 100 101 102 103 104 105
P
(s
)
s
Win-loss position duration ratio
d
losing
winning
10-8
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1 100 101 102 103
P
(u
)
u
Win-loss position ROI ratio
e
10-8
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1 100 101 102 103
P
(u
)
u
Win-loss position ROI ratio
f
losing
winning
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
P
(w
)
w
Winning percentage
g
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
P
(w
)
w
Winning percentage
1/2
1/3
1/4
1/5
1/6
2/3
3/4
h
losing
winning
Fig.4
20
Figure 1 Performance comparison of different types of trades. (a) Fraction of positive
trades. Mirror trade has the highest fraction of positive trades. (b) Mean ROI. Mirror trade
is the only trade type that has the positive 〈ROI〉. Here error bars mean the standard error
of the mean (SEM). (c) Mean ROI of positive trades. Mirror trade has the lowest 〈ROI〉 for
positive trades. (d) Mean ROI of negative trades. Mirror trade has the highest negative
〈ROI〉 for negative trades.
Figure 2 Duration distribution of different trade types. For each trade type, we further
distinguish negative and positive trades based on their net profit. The trades with zero
net profit are negligible. The duration distributions of negative and positive trades are
normalized according to their corresponding occurrence. (a) All trades. (b) Non-social
trades. (c) Copy trades. (d) Mirror trades.
Figure 3 Disposition effect in different trade types. Here, we bin the net profit p of different
trade types in logarithmic bins. (If p < 0, we bin it using |p|.) For the trades contained
in each bin, we draw the box-and-whisker plot for their duration (τ ), representing the
minimum, first quartile, median, third quartiles, and maximum of the data in the bin. (a)
All trades. (b) Non-social trades. (c) Copy trades. (d) Mirror trades.
Figure 4 Characterizing winning and losing traders based on historical trading behavior.
(a, b) Distribution of risk-reward ratio (r := 〈p+〉
〈|p
−
|〉
). p+ and p− are the profit of winning
positions and the loss of losing positions, respectively, of traders. (c, d) Distribution of
win-loss waiting time ratio (s := 〈τ+〉
〈τ
−
〉
). Here 〈τ+〉 and 〈τ−〉 are the average duration time
21
of winning and losing positions, respectively, of traders. (e, f) Distribution of win-loss
ROI ratio (u := 〈ROI+〉
〈|ROI
−
|〉
). ROI+ and ROI− are the ROI of winning and losing positions,
respectively, of traders. (g, h) Distribution of winning percentage (w := N+
N++N−
) of traders.
N+ and N− are the number of winning and losing positions, respectively, of traders.
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